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Abstract A solution concept on a class of transferable utility coalitional
games is a multifunction satisfying given criteria of economic rationality. Ev-
ery solution associates a set of payoff allocations with a coalitional game. This
general definition specializes to a number of well-known concepts such as the
core, Shapley value, nucleolus etc. In this note it is shown that in many cases
a solution factors through a set of games whose members can be viewed as
elementary building blocks for the solution. Two factoring maps have a very
simply structure. The first decomposes a game into its elementary components
and the second one combines the output of the first map into the respective
solution outcome. The decomposition is then studied mainly for certain poly-
hedral cones of zero-normalized games.
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1 Introduction
The main goal of this paper is to initiate research into the structure of certain
solution concepts for coalitional games. Our setting is that of coalitional games
with transferable utility and a finite player set. A solution on a class of games is
a function that associates a set of feasible payoff allocations with a game from
the class. See the book [12] for details on cooperative games and an in-depth
exposition of key solution concepts.
Section 2 formally introduces basic notions and elementary results about
coalitional games and their special families. In particular, it is emphasized that
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zero-normalization enables us to transform certain polyhedral cones of games
into pointed polyhedral cones, which contain extreme rays and are thus conic
hulls of their finite sets of generators.
The decomposition for solutions is defined in Section 3. The main idea is
captured by the commutative diagram (7), which is often repeated in cases of
particular solution concepts for the sake of clarity. It is then shown that several
important solutions allow for such a factorization. Specifically, in the rest of
Section 3 it is proved that every probabilistic value, nucleolus, Weber set, and
selectope decompose in the sense of diagram (7). There are other solutions,
however, for which the sought decomposition is not natural or it may not
exist at all. As examples of such solutions we can mention Von Neumann–
Morgenstern stable sets or bargaining sets.
Interestingly enough, the core solution factorizes when it is restricted onto
a suitable cone of games. This is explained in Section 4 whose results apply to
additive solutions defined on the linear space of all games or on the cones of
games containing additive games as the lineality space. Such cones of games
are, for example, the cone of supermodular games, exact games, and totally
balanced games, respectively. The existence of decomposition then amounts to
the statement that the corresponding solutions are completely determined by
the solution map restricted to a finite set of generators; see Proposition 1 and
Theorem 1. For example, it is proved in [16] that the cores of supermodular
games coincide with the class of convex polytopes known as generalized per-
mutohedra, and the cores associated with extreme supermodular games are
precisely the so-called indecomposable generalized permutohedra. Recent pro-
gresses in the study of the cone of balanced games make it possible to frame an
analogous question for the generators of the “maximal linear regions” where
the core is additive and positively homogeneous; see [11] for details. Whereas
the core solution is additive when restricted to particular classes of games,
there exists its decomposition (7) using lattice operations only; see Section
4.1. Inspired by the max-convex representation of coalitional games [8], we
show that the cores of weakly superadditive games are fairly special convex
polytopes; this is a consequence of Theorem 2.
2 Coalitional Games
We use the standard notions and results from cooperative game theory; see
[12]. Let N = {1, . . . , n} be a finite set of players for some integer n ≥ 2
and let P(N) be the powerset of N . Any set A ∈ P(N) is called a coalition.
A (transferable-utility coalitional) game is a function v : P(N)→ R satisfying
v(∅) = 0. By G(N) we denote the linear space of all games with the player set
N . The dimension of G(N) is 2n − 1. For any nonempty coalition A ⊆ N , the
restriction of v ∈ G(N) to P(A) is called a subgame of v. A game v ∈ G(N) is
called
– weakly superadditive whenever v(A ∪ {i}) ≥ v(A) + v({i}) holds for all
A ⊆ N and every i ∈ N \A,
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– monotone if v(A) ≤ v(B) for all A ⊆ B ⊆ N ,
– supermodular if v(A ∪B) + v(A ∩B) ≥ v(A) + v(B) for all A,B ⊆ N ,
– totally monotone if for any k ≥ 2 and all A1, . . . , Ak ⊆ N ,
v(
k⋃
i=1
Ai) ≥
∑
I⊆{1,...,k}
I 6=∅
(−1)|I|+1 · v(
⋂
i∈I
Ai),
– zero-normalized if v({i}) = 0 for all i ∈ N ,
– zero-monotone if it is zero-normalized and monotone,
– additive if v(A ∪B) = v(A) + v(B) for all A,B ⊆ N with A ∩B = ∅.
By 0 we denote the game in G(N) that is identically equal to 0. For any
nonempty coalition A ⊆ N , a unanimity game (on A) is given by
uA(B) =
{
1 A ⊆ B,
0 otherwise,
B ⊆ N.
The following notation will be used for particular sets of games:
GWS(N) = {v ∈ G(N) | v is weakly superadditive}
GM(N) = {v ∈ G(N) | v is monotone}
GS(N) = {v ∈ G(N) | v is supermodular}
GTM(N) = {v ∈ G(N) | v is totally monotone}
GZM(N) = {v ∈ G(N) | v is zero-monotone}
GA(N) = {v ∈ G(N) | v is additive}
G0(N) = {v ∈ G(N) | v is zero-normalized}
G0⋆(N) = G⋆(N) ∩ G
0(N),where ⋆ ∈ {WS, . . . }
Many of the sets of games above are in fact polyhedral cones. For all the unex-
plained notions concerning convexity and polyhedral sets we refer the reader
to [1,4]. Let ⋆ ∈ {WS, S,TM}. It follows immediately from the definitions that
G⋆(N) is a polyhedral cone, GA(N) is a linear space, and GA(N) ⊆ G⋆(N).
Since GA(N) = G⋆(N)∩−G⋆(N), the linear space GA(N) is the lineality space
of G⋆(N). Moreover, the linear space G0(N) is complementary to GA(N) in
G(N), that is, G0(N) ∩ GA(N) = {0} and G0(N) + GA(N) = G(N). Thus, for
any game v ∈ G(N), there exist unique w ∈ G0(N) and m ∈ GA(N) such that
v = w +m. Indeed, it suffices to put w = vˆ and m = v − vˆ, where
vˆ(A) = v(A)−
∑
i∈A
v({i}), A ⊆ N, (1)
and observe that vˆ ∈ G0(N) and v − vˆ ∈ GA(N).
It follows from the above considerations that G0⋆(N) is a pointed polyhedral
cone and we obtain the decomposition
G⋆(N) = G
0
⋆(N) + GA(N), ⋆ ∈ {WS, S,TM}. (2)
This means that for any game v ∈ G⋆(N) there exist unique w ∈ G0⋆(N) and
m ∈ GA(N) such that v = w +m, where necessarily w = vˆ and m = v − vˆ.
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3 Decomposition of Solutions
A vector x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Rn is called a payoff allocation. The total payoff
allocation assigned to a nonempty coalition A ⊆ N is the number x(A) =∑
i∈A xi and we further define x(∅) = 0. There is an obvious linear isomor-
phism
e : Rn → GA(N) (3)
such that e(x) = mx ∈ GA(N), where mx is the additive game given by
mx(A) = x(A), A ⊆ N. (4)
Note that the inverse linear mapping e−1 : GA(N) → Rn just restricts an
additive game v ∈ GA(N) to the atoms of P(N),
e−1(v) = (v({i}))i∈N . (5)
We define solutions of coalitional games. Let P(Rn) be the powerset of Rn.
By Γ (N) we denote an arbitrary nonempty subset of G(N). A solution is a
set-valued mapping
σ : Γ (N)→ P(Rn).
Thus, every element x ∈ σ(v), where v ∈ Γ (N), is considered as a final payoff
allocation in the game v. We remark that every solution σ according to [12,
Definition 2.3.1] must also satisfy feasibility, that is,
σ(v) ⊆ {x ∈ Rn | x(N) ≤ v(N)}, v ∈ Γ (N). (6)
Most of the solutions discussed in further sections of this paper meet the con-
dition (6). Additional assumptions on σ determine various solution concepts,
such as the core mapping, selectope, nucleolus, Weber set etc. By X + Y we
denote the Minkowski sum of sets X and Y in Rn defined by
X + Y = {x+ y | x ∈ X, y ∈ X}.
For any c ∈ R, let c · X = {cx | x ∈ X}. When X is convex, there is no
ambiguity in writing cX , where c ∈ N, since in this case we have
c ·X = X + · · ·+X︸ ︷︷ ︸
cX
.
We say that a solution σ : Γ (N)→ P(Rn) is
– nonempty if σ(v) 6= ∅ for all v ∈ Γ (N),
– single-valued if σ(v) is a singleton for all v ∈ Γ (N),
– superadditive if σ(v + w) ⊇ σ(v) + σ(w) for all v, w ∈ Γ (N),
– additive if σ(v + w) = σ(v) + σ(w) for all v, w ∈ Γ (N),
– covariant under strategic equivalence if, for every v ∈ Γ (N), c > 0, and
every w ∈ GA(N), we have σ(cv + w) = c · σ(v) + {e−1(w)}, where e−1 is
as in (5),
– positively homogeneous if σ(cv) = c ·σ(v) for all v ∈ Γ (N) and every c > 0,
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– positive if, for every nonnegative game v ∈ GTM(N), any x ∈ σ(v) has only
nonnegative coordinates.
Remark 1 Let G+TM(N) be the family of all nonnegative totally monotone
games. Note that
G+TM(N) = GTM(N) ∩ GM(N).
Then G+TM(N) forms a pointed polyhedral cone, which plays a crucial role for
the representation of games and the respective Choquet integrals; see [5]. In
particular, letting G+TM(N) be the positive cone of G(N), we obtain a partial
order 6 on G(N) such that v 6 w whenever w − v ∈ G+TM(N). Thus, G(N)
becomes a Riesz space whose order is 6, and for any game v ∈ G(N) there
exist uniquely determined games w1, w2 ∈ G
+
TM(N) such that v = w1 − w2.
With these conventions in mind, the definition of a positive solution can be
rephrased as follows: For any 0 6 v ∈ G(N), every vector x ∈ σ(v) satisfies
0 ≤ x, where ≤ is the pointwise order on Rn.
The main goal of this paper is to discuss the cases when a given solution
σ : Γ (N)→ Rn can be decomposed as follows.
Γ (N) Ω(N)Z
P(Rn)
σ
τ
α (7)
In the above diagram Z is a nonempty set and ∅ 6= Ω(N) ⊆ G(N). Since (7)
commutes, σ = α ◦ τ , where τ : Γ (N)→ Ω(N)Z and α : Ω(N)Z → P(Rn) are
some maps. The interpretation is that the solution σ factors through the set
Ω(N)Z , whose elements are maps ω : Z → Ω(N). We will use the notation
ωz to denote the image of z ∈ Z under ω. Hence, the map ω selects a game
ωz ∈ Ω(N), for every z ∈ Z. The point is that the games in Ω(N) can be
considered as elementary building blocks for the construction of the solution
σ. The map α then aggregates the games ωz into a set of payoff allocations
α(ω) = α(τ(v)) = σ(v), for every v ∈ Γ (N). The dependence of Z, Ω(N), τ ,
and α on the solution mapping σ is tacitly understood.
In the sequel we are interested only in the decompositions of σ that are
non-trivial in the following sense. Put Ω(N) = Γ (N) and Z = {z}. Then the
set of all maps Z → Ω(N) is in bijection with Ω(N), so it is sensible to identify
a map ω : Z → Ω(N) with the unique element v ∈ Ω(N) in the range of ω.
Hence, we can define τ(v) = v and α(v) = σ(v), which makes the diagram
(7) commute trivially. In all other cases we will say that σ has a non-trivial
decomposition.
In the rest of this section we will show that many existing solution concepts
have a non-trivial decomposition (7). Moreover, such decompositions are often
easily constructed from the corresponding definitions of those solutions.
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3.1 Probabilistic values
A mapping ψ = (ψ1, . . . , ψn) : G(N) → Rn is a probabilistic value [17] if for
each player i ∈ N there exists a probability measure pi : P(N \ {i}) → [0, 1]
such that
ψi(v) =
∑
A⊆N\{i}
pi(A) · (v(A ∪ {i})− v(A)), v ∈ G(N).
For all v ∈ G(N), we will denote the marginal contribution of player i ∈ N
to an arbitrary coalition A ⊆ N by Dvi (A) = v(A ∪ {i})− v(A). Note that A
is allowed to contain the player i. This yields a game Dvi ∈ G(N) and a map
Dv : i ∈ N 7→ Dvi . In order to see that the solution ψ decomposes non-trivially,
it suffices to put Γ (N) = Ω(N) = G(N), Z = N , and τ(v) = Dv for all
v ∈ G(N). Let α : G(N)N → Rn be defined by
αi(ω) =
∑
A⊆N\{i}
pi(A) · ωi(A), ω = (ωj)j∈N ∈ G(N)
N , i ∈ N.
Then the diagram (7) commutes with these definitions, since for all v ∈ G(N)
and every i ∈ N ,
αi(τ(v)) = αi(D
v) =
∑
A⊆N\{i}
pi(A) ·D
v
i (A) = ψi(v).
3.2 Nucleolus
Let K be a nonempty compact convex subset of Rn. For any x ∈ K and every
v ∈ G(N), let θxv be a game such that θ
x
v (A) = v(A) − x(A), where A ⊆ N .
Further, define a vector θ(x) = (θi(x))i=1,...,2n with coordinates θi(x) = θ
x
v (Ai),
where A1, . . . , A2n is an enumeration of all the subsets of N satisfying the
condition:
For all i, j = 1, . . . , 2n, if i < j, then θxv (Ai) ≥ θ
x
v (Aj).
Let  denote the lexicographic order on R2
n
. The nucleolus of v with respect
to K is the set
N (v,K) = {x ∈ K | θ(x)  θ(y), for all y ∈ K}.
Since K 6= ∅ is compact convex, the nucleolus N (v,K) is nonempty and single-
valued for every v ∈ G(N); see [14] for further details.
We will show that (7) commutes with the data defined as follows. Let
Γ (N) = Ω(N) = G(N), Z = K. For any v ∈ G(N), let θv be the mapping
x ∈ K 7→ θxv ∈ G(N) and put
τ(v) = θv, v ∈ G(N).
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Let ω be any mapping K → G(N) and the image of x ∈ K under ω be now
denoted by ωx. We define a vector ω(x) ∈ R2
n
using ωx completely analo-
gously to the definition of θ(x) using θxv above. Let MinS be the lexicographic
minimum of a set ∅ 6= S ⊆ R2
n
. Put
α(ω) = Min{ω(x) | x ∈ K}, ω ∈ G(N)K .
Thus, for every v ∈ G(N),
α(τ(v)) = α(θv) = Min{θ(x) | x ∈ K} = N (v,K),
which means that (7) is commutative using the definitions above.
3.3 Weber set
Let Π(N) denote the set of all permutations π : N → N . A marginal vector of
a game v ∈ G(N) with respect to π ∈ Π(N) is the payoff allocation xv,π ∈ Rn
with coordinates
xv,πi = v

 ⋃
j≤π−1(i)
{π(j)}

− v

 ⋃
j<π−1(i)
{π(j)}

 , i ∈ N. (8)
The Weber set of a game v ∈ G(N) is the convex hull of all the marginal
vectors of v,
W(v) = conv{xv,π | π ∈ Π(N)}.
Let xv : Π(N) → Rn be the payoff-array transformation, which was con-
sidered in [16]. Precisely, xv is a mapping π ∈ Π(N) 7→ xv,π ∈ Rn. Put
Γ (N) = G(N), Ω(N) = GA(N), Z = Π(N), and τ(v) = e ◦ xv for every
v ∈ G(N), where e is as in (3). Define
α(ω) = conv{e−1(ωπ) | π ∈ Π(N)}, ω ∈ GA(N)
Π(N),
and observe that the diagram (9) commutes with these definitions since
α(τ(v)) = α(e ◦ xv) = conv{e−1(e(xvπ)) | π ∈ Π(N)} =W(v), v ∈ G(N).
G(N) GA(N)Π(N)
P(Rn)
W
τ
α (9)
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3.4 Selectope
The selectope contains all possible reasonable distributions of Harsanyi divi-
dends among the players; see [3], for example. Specifically, it is constructed as
follows. A mapping a : P(N)\{∅} → N such that a(A) ∈ A is called a selector.
Let S(N) be the set of all selectors. The selector value of a game v ∈ G(N)
corresponding to a ∈ S(N) is a vector ϕa(v) ∈ Rn with coordinates
ϕai (v) =
∑
A∈P(N)\{∅}
a(A)=i
mv(A), i ∈ N,
where mv is the Mo¨bius transform (Harsanyi dividend) of v given by
mv(A) =
∑
B⊆A
(−1)|A\B| · v(B), A ⊆ N.
The selectope of v is then the set
sel(v) = conv{ϕa(v) | a ∈ S(N)}.
It is clear that sel(v) 6= ∅ for all games v ∈ G(N).
The definition of solution sel on G(N) is in fact captured by the diagram
(7). Indeed, put Γ (N) = G(N), Ω(N) = GA(N), and Z = S(N). For any game
v ∈ G(N), let ϕ(v) : S(N) → Rn be the map a ∈ S(N) 7→ ϕa(v). Define the
map
τ : G(N)→ GA(N)
S(N)
as τ(v) = e ◦ ϕ(v), where e is defined by (3). Further, let ω ∈ GA(N)S(N) and
put
α(ω) = conv{e−1(ωa) | a ∈ S(N)},
where ωa ∈ GA(N). Thus, for any v ∈ G(N),
α(τ(v)) = α(e ◦ ϕ(v)) = conv{ϕa(v) | a ∈ S(N)} = sel(v).
This means that the diagram (7) commutes with the above definitions.
4 Decomposition of Additive Solutions
We will first look at a special case when the domain of a solution σ is even
a linear space. The typical example of a non-trivial factorization (7) of σ is
when σ is an additive solution satisfying additional conditions on the linear
space of all games G(N).
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Proposition 1 Let B = {v1, . . . , vk} be a basis of G(N) and σ be a nonempty
solution on G(N) that is superadditive, positive, and such that σ(0) = {0}.
Put Z = {1, . . . , k} and B¯ = {civi | vi ∈ B, ci ∈ R, i ∈ Z}. For any
v ∈ G(N), define τ(v) = (aivi)i∈Z , where
∑
i∈Z aivi is the unique linear com-
bination expressing v, and
α(ω) =
∑
i∈Z
ci · σ(vi), ω = (civi)i∈Z , ci ∈ R.
Then this diagram commutes:
G(N) B¯Z
P(Rn)
σ
τ
α (10)
Proof It is clear that the definition of τ is correct since B is a basis. First,
we will prove that σ is a single-valued solution that is even a linear mapping
G(N)→ Rn. It follows from the assumptions about σ that
{0} = σ(0) ⊇ σ(v) + σ(−v), for all v ∈ G(N).
Since σ(v) 6= ∅, this implies that σ(v) is necessarily a singleton. Then super-
additivity says that, for all v, w ∈ G(N) and some x, y, z ∈ Rn,
{x} = σ(v + w) ⊇ σ(v) + σ(w) = {y}+ {z} = {y + z},
which means that σ is an additive mapping G(N) → Rn. Observe that addi-
tivity implies σ(−v) = −σ(v). We will show that σ is even a linear mapping.
First, let a and b be integers with b 6= 0. Then
σ(a
b
v) = aσ(1
b
v) = a
b
bσ(1
b
v) = a
b
σ(v).
Hence, σ is a linear mapping when G(N) is understood as a vector space over
the field of rational numbers. Assume now that v is a nonnegative totally
monotone game. Let a ∈ R and p, q be rational numbers such that p ≤ a ≤ q.
Since v is nonnegative, we get pv ≤ av ≤ qv. Hence,
pσ(v) = σ(pv) ≤ σ(av) ≤ σ(qv) = qσ(v).
Since σ is a positive mapping, we get σ(av) = aσ(v). As every game in G(N)
is a difference of nonnegative totally monotone games, it follows that σ is a
linear mapping.
Now, let v =
∑
i∈Z aivi for necessarily unique ai ∈ R and vi ∈ B, where
i ∈ Z. Then, by linearity of σ,
α(τ(v)) = α((aivi)i∈Z) =
∑
i∈Z
ai · σ(vi) =
∑
i∈Z
σ(aivi) = σ(
∑
i∈Z
aivi) = σ(v).
Hence, the diagram (10) commutes. ⊓⊔
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The seemingly weak conditions of Proposition 1 make σ into a linear map.
On top of that, since its domain is the entire linear space G(N), the solution
σ is fully determined by the images σ(vi) of the basis elements vi ∈ B. We
will now consider a more natural situation when σ is not considered on G(N),
but rather on a smaller set of games such as the polyhedral cones of games
discussed in Section 2. Other examples of such classes of games include exact
games and totally balanced games whose definititions are repeated below; see
[15] and [7], respectively.
For any game v ∈ G(N), the set C(v) of all allocations that are Pareto
efficient and coalitionally rational is called the core of v. Precisely,
C(v) = {x ∈ Rn | x(N) = v(N) and x(A) ≥ v(A) for all A ⊆ N}.
A game v ∈ G(N) is called
– balanced if C(v) 6= ∅,
– exact if v(A) = min{x(A) | x ∈ C(v)} for all A ⊆ N ,
– totally balanced if every subgame of v is balanced.
Every exact game is totally balanced. Put
GB(N) = {v ∈ G(N) | v is balanced}
GE(N) = {v ∈ G(N) | v is exact}
GTB(N) = {v ∈ G(N) | v is totally balanced}
G0⋆(N) = G⋆(N) ∩ G
0(N),where ⋆ ∈ {B,E,TB}
It is wellknown that
GTM(N) ⊆ GS(N) ⊆ GE(N) ⊆ GTB(N) ⊆ GB(N),
where all the inclusions are proper for n ≥ 4. The set of all balanced games
GB(N) is a polyhedral cone as a direct consequence of the Bondareva–Shapley
theorem. The convex cones GE(N) and GTB(N) can be described by finitely-
many linear inequalities too; see [2] and [9]. None of those cones is pointed,
however, since each of them contains the set of all additive games GA(N) as
the lineality space. Then the same technique as in Section 2 can be employed
to show that
G⋆(N) = G
0
⋆(N) + GA(N), (11)
where ⋆ ∈ {B,E,TB} and G0⋆(N) is a pointed polyhedral cone.
Minkowski’s theorem says that G0⋆(N) is the conic hull of its (finitely-many)
extreme rays. Needless to say, the expression of a given game as a conic com-
bination of generators for the cone is usually highly non-unique. We will need
the following result (Lemma 1), which makes it possible to achieve uniqueness
of the conic representation with respect to a chosen subdivision of the cone
into simplex cones; see [4, Theorem III.1.12]. We recall the needed terminology.
A pointed polyhedral cone C in a finite-dimensional vector space is a simplex
cone whenever the finite set of generators of its extreme rays is linearly inde-
pendent. A polyhedral fan is a finite set F of polyhedral cones satisfying the
following conditions:
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1. If C ∈ F and F is a face of C, then F ∈ F .
2. If C,D ∈ F , then the intersection C ∩D is a face of both C and D.
A simplicial fan is a polyhedral fan whose every cone is a simplex cone. The
set
⋃
C∈F C is the support of a polyhedral fan F .
Lemma 1 Let C be a pointed polyhedral cone. Then there exists a simplicial
fan F = {C1, . . . , Ck} such that:
1. The support of F is C.
2. For any i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, there is a subset Si of the generators for C such
that Ci is the conic hull of Si.
Moreover, for every x ∈ C, there exists a unique simplex cone Ci ∈ F with
x ∈ Ci and such that Ci has the smallest dimension among the cones Cj ∈ F
containing x.
The import of Lemma 1 is that it enables us to express a given element in
a cone uniquely, although the uniqueness is always understood with respect
to an arbitrarily chosen simplicial fan satisfying the conditions of Lemma 1.
Namely any x ∈ C has the unique expression as a conic combination of the
generators for the smallest simplex cone Ci ∈ F with x ∈ Ci, where F is any
simplicial fan subdividing C in the sense of Lemma 1.
Recall that by vˆ we denote the zero-normalized game (1). In the next
result the set of games K(N) is any polyhedral cone satisfying the conditions
of Theorem 1, not necessarily any of the cones G⋆(N) discussed above. Denote
K0(N) = K(N) ∩ G0(N).
Theorem 1 Let K(N) ⊆ G(N) be a polyhedral cone whose lineality space is
GA(N) and assume that σ is an additive and positively homogeneous solution
on K(N). Let B = {v1, . . . , vk} be a set of generators of K0(N) and put Z =
{1, . . . , k, k + 1}, B¯ = {civi | vi ∈ B, ci ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , k}. Further, let F be a
simplicial fan whose support is K0(N).
For any v ∈ K(N), let τ(v) = (a1v1, . . . , akvk, v − vˆ), where
∑k
i=1 aivi is
the unique conic combination expressing vˆ with respect to F . Put
α(ω) =
∑
i∈Z
ci · σ(wi), ω = (ciwi)i∈Z ∈ (B¯ ∪ GA(N))
Z , ci ≥ 0.
Then this diagram commutes:
K(N) (B¯ ∪ GA(N))Z
P(Rn)
σ
τ
α (12)
Proof The definition of τ is sensible by Lemma 1. We need to verify that (12)
is commutative. Let v ∈ K(N). Then
α(τ(v)) = α((a1v1, . . . , akvk, v − vˆ)) =
k∑
i=1
ai · σ(vi) + σ(v − vˆ).
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By additivity and positive homogeneity of σ,
k∑
i=1
ai · σ(vi) = σ(
k∑
i=1
aivi) = σ(vˆ).
Thus, α(τ(v)) = σ(vˆ) + σ(v − vˆ) = σ(v). ⊓⊔
It is sensible to apply Theorem 1 to any cone K(N) that satisfies the conditions
above and, at the same time, whose structure of extreme rays is known or for
which extremality of a given game in the cone is not too difficult to check. An
example thereof is the cone of supermodular games [16] and there are strong
indications that also the cone of exact games is amenable to such a description;
see [10] for the details.
4.1 Nonadditive decomposition of core
In this section the linear space of all games G(N) is considered with the lattice
order given by the pointwise supremum ∨ and the pointwise infimum ∧. We
will make use of the following nonadditive representation of the core solution,
which is mentioned in [8].
Lemma 2 If v1, . . . , vk ∈ G(N) are games satisfying the condition v1(N) =
· · · = vk(N), then C(
∨k
i=1 vi) =
⋂k
i=1 C(vi).
Proof Put v =
∨k
i=1 vi. Let x ∈ C(v). For every i = 1, . . . , k and all A ⊆ N ,
the conditions x(N) = v(N) = vi(N) and x(A) ≥ v(A) ≥ vi(A) are satisfied,
which gives x ∈
⋂k
i=1 C(vi). Conversely, assume that x ∈
⋂k
i=1 C(vi). Then
x(N) = vi(N) = v(N) for any i = 1, . . . , k. Let A ⊆ N . Since x(A) ≥ vi(A)
for all i = 1, . . . , k and v is the supremum of games v1, . . . , vk, it follows that
x(A) ≥ v(A). Hence, x ∈ C(v). ⊓⊔
From now one we focus on the cone of weakly superadditive games GWS(N).
Clearly, G0WS(N) = GZM(N) and then (2) gives
GWS(N) = GZM(N) + GA(N).
We will base our representation on the polyhedral cone G0TM(N) of zero-
normalized totally monotone capacities. Observe that every game v ∈ G0TM(N)
is even monotone. Indeed, let A ⊆ B ⊆ N . It is enough to prove v(A) ≤ v(B)
in case that |B| = |A|+ 1. Let B = A ∪ {i}, where i /∈ N \A. Then
v(B) = v(A ∪ {i}) ≥ v(A) + v({i})− v(∅) = v(A).
Thus, G0TM(N) ⊆ GZM(N). It is easy to show that the polyhedral cone G
0
TM(N)
is pointed and the generators of its extreme rays are the unanimity games uB
for all B ⊆ N such that |B| ≥ 2 (see, e.g., [6, Theorem 2.58]). Thus, every
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game v ∈ G0TM(N) is almost positive, which means that there exist λA ≥ 0,
where A ⊆ N and |A| ≥ 2, such that
v =
∑
A⊆N
|A|≥2
λA · uA.
For any v ∈ G(N) and every nonempty B ⊆ N we define a game
vB = v(B) · uB + (v(N)− v(B)) · uN . (13)
The max-decomposition of an arbitrary coalitional game was proved in [8].
Herein a simple proof of the same result is provided in our special setting of
zero-normalized games.
Lemma 3 The following hold true for any v ∈ GZM(N):
1. v =
∨
∅6=B⊆N v
B .
2. vB ∈ G0TM(N) and v
B(N) = v(N), for all nonempty B ⊆ N .
Conversely, let v1, . . . , vk ∈ G0TM(N) be such that v1(N) = · · · = vk(N) and
define w =
∨k
i=1 vi. Then w ∈ GZM(N) and vi(N) = w(N) for all i = 1, . . . , k.
Proof Since v is monotone, both v(B) and v(N) − v(B) are nonnegative for
every ∅ 6= B ⊆ N . Hence, vB is totally monotone since it is a conic combination
of unanimity games uB and uN . It follows from the definition of v
B that
vB(N) = v(N) and vB(B) = v(B), for all ∅ 6= B ⊆ N . Hence, we only need
to show that vB(A) ≤ v(A) for every nonempty A ( N . Let A ⊆ B. Then
vB(A) = v(B) ≤ v(A), by monotonicity of v. If A 6⊆ B, the the same argument
shows that vB(A) = 0 ≤ v(A).
For the second part of the assertion, observe that w({i}) = 0 for all i ∈ N .
Since every game wi is monotone, it follows that for all A ⊆ B ⊆ N ,
w(A) =
k∨
i=1
vi(A) ≤
k∨
i=1
vi(B) = w(B).
Clearly, vi(N) = w(N) for all i = 1, . . . , k. ⊓⊔
Combining Lemma 2 with Lemma 3, the core of every game v ∈ GZM(N)
can be written as
C(v) =
⋂
∅6=B⊆N
C(vB), (14)
where vB is defined by (13). We will prove that the core solution on Γ (N) =
GWS(N) factors through the set Ω(N)Z , where we put Ω(N) = G0TM(N) ∪
GA(N) and Z = P(N).
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Theorem 2 Define the maps
τ : GWS(N)→ (G
0
TM(N) ∪ GA(N))
P(N)
and
α : (G0TM(N) ∪ GA(N))
P(N) → P(Rn)
as τ(v) = (v − vˆ, (vˆB)B∈P(N)\{∅}), for all v ∈ GWS(N), and
α(ω) = C(ω∅)+
⋂
B∈P(N)
B 6=∅
C(ωB), ω = (ωB)B∈P(N) ∈ (G
0
TM(N)∪GA(N))
P(N).
Then this diagram commutes:
GWS(N) (G0TM(N) ∪ GA(N))
P(N)
P(Rn)
C
τ
α
Proof Let v ∈ GWS(N). Then
α(τ(v)) = α((v − vˆ, (vˆB)B∈P(N)\{∅})) = C(v − vˆ) +
⋂
B∈P(N)
B 6=∅
C(vˆB). (15)
As vˆ is zero-normalized we get vˆ =
∨
∅6=B⊆N vˆ
B and (14) says that⋂
B∈P(N)
B 6=∅
C(vˆB) = C(vˆ). (16)
Since v − vˆ is an additive game, the core C(v − vˆ) is a singleton whose only
payoff allocation is the vector e−1(v − vˆ), where e−1 is the linear map (5). As
the core solution is covariant under strategic equivalence, combining (15) with
(16) yields
α(τ(v)) = C(v − vˆ) + C(vˆ) = C(v).
Hence, the diagram commutes. ⊓⊔
Theorem 2 streamlines the decomposition (14) into the cores of games
vB. Such cores have a very special shape from the viewpoint of the theory of
polyhedra. Observe that the core of a unanimity game uA with ∅ 6= A ⊆ N is
the standard (|A| − 1)-simplex
∆A = conv{δ
i | i ∈ A},
where a vector δi ∈ Rn has coordinates
δij =
{
1 i = j,
0 i 6= j.
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Using (13) we get
C(vB) = v(B) · C(uB) + (v(N)− v(B)) · C(uN)
= v(B) ·∆B + (v(N)− v(B)) ·∆N
= conv{v(B) · δi + (v(N)− v(B)) · δj | i ∈ B, j ∈ N}.
Thus, each core C(vB) is a special weighted Minkowski sum of two standard
simplices, which are called nestohedra and count among important convex poly-
topes studied in [13]. Then one of the consequences of Theorem 2 is that the
core of every weakly superadditive game is (a possibly translated) intersection
(14) of such nestohedra. It is an interesting open question for further research
if the intersection (14) allows for an alternative characterization, which would
capture the class of all polytopes arising as cores of weakly superadditive
games.
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